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Abstract
When people evaluate claims they often rely on what comedian Stephen 
Colbert calls truthiness, judging claims using subjective feelings of  truth, rather 
than drawing on facts. Over seven experiments I examined how nonprobative 
photos can manufacture truthiness in just a few seconds. I found that a quick 
exposure to a photo that relates to, but does not provide any probative evidence 
about the accuracy of  claims can systematically bias people to conclude claims are 
true. In Experiments 1A and 1B, people saw familiar and unfamiliar celebrity 
names and, for each, quickly responded "true" or "false" to the claim "This 
famous person is alive" or (between subjects) "This famous person is dead." Within 
subjects, some names appeared with a photo of  the celebrity engaged in his/her 
profession whereas other names appeared alone. For unfamiliar celebrity names, 
photos increased the likelihood that subjects judged the claim to be true. 
Moreover, the same photos inflated the truth of  "Alive" and "Dead" claims, 
suggesting that photos did not produce an "alive bias," but a "truth bias." 
Experiment 2 showed that photos and verbal information similarly inflated 
truthiness, suggesting that the effect is not peculiar to photographs per se.  
Experiment 3 demonstrated that nonprobative photos can also enhance the 
truthiness of  general knowledge claims (Giraffes are the only mammals that cannot jump). 
In Experiments 4-6 I examined boundary conditions for truthiness. I found that 
the semantic relationship between the photo and claim mattered. Experiment 4 
showed that in a within-subject design, related photos produced truthiness, but 
unrelated photos acted just like the no photo condition. But unrelated photos were 
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not always benign, Experiment 5 showed that their effects depended on 
experimental context. In a mixed design, related photos produced truthiness and 
unrelated photos produced falsiness. 
Although the effect of  related photos was robust across materials and variation 
in experimental context, when I used a fully between-subjects design in 
Experiment 6, the effect of  photos (related and unrelated) was eliminated. These 
effects add to a growing literature on how nonprobative information can  
influence people’s decisions and suggest that nonprobative photographs do more 
than simply decorate, they can rapidly manufacture feelings of  truth. As with 
many effects in the cognitive psychology literature, the photo-truthiness effect 
depends on the way in which people process and interpret photos when evaluating 
the truth of  claims.
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Chapter 1
“I am no fan of  dictionaries or reference books,” says comedian Stephen 
Colbert, “constantly telling us what is or isn't true.” Instead of  looking up claims 
in a book, Colbert urges viewers to “try looking it up in your gut.” This is 
truthiness: “truth that comes from the gut, not books.1”  Of  course, when people 
evaluate claims they use both rational thinking and intuitive hunches—often doing 
so, as Colbert implied, without having access to the facts. A century of  research 
shows that these feeling-based judgments are susceptible to influence from general 
beliefs, prejudices, and expectations, from features of  the current context such as 
demand characteristics, and from aspects of  past experience that interact with the 
present to privilege the accessibility of  some memories over others (Bransford & 
Johnson; 1972; Henkel & Mather, 2007; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; 
Lewandowsky, Stritzke, Oberauer, & Morales, 2005; Lindsay, 2008; Ozubko & 
Fugelsang, 2011). In this thesis I use the term “truthiness” to refer to a category of  
phenomena in which the addition of  nonprobative information causes people to 
shift rapidly towards believing a claim (see also the illusory truth effect; Begg, Anas, & 
Farinacci, 1992).2
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1  see http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/24039/october-17-2005/the-word---truthiness
2 Portions of this thesis appeared in: 
Newman, E. J., Garry, M., Bernstein, D. M., Kantner, J., & Lindsay, D. S. (2012). Non- probative photos (or words) promote 
truthinesss. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review. doi: 10.3758/s13423-012-0292-0
Newman, E. J., Garry, M., Unkelbach, C., Bernstein, D. M., & Lindsay, D. S. (2012). Truthiness and Falsiness of Trivia Claims 
Depend on Judgmental Contexts. Manuscript submitted for review.
But I have expanded on the introduction, data analysis and discussion here.
Judging Truth
Suppose you evaluate the claim “Stephen King is alive.” You are probably 
familiar with Stephen King. The cognitive literature suggests that you will try to 
retrieve information from memory—related knowledge, thoughts, and images—to 
help you decide whether he is alive (Graesser & Hemphill, 1991). We know from 
research on confirmation bias that people search for information that supports 
their hypotheses—perhaps because (as per Spinoza’s notion) comprehending a 
claim entails representing it as true, whereas falsifying it requires a secondary, 
more effortful step (Clark & Chase, 1972; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993; 
Nickerson, 1998; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Richter, Schroeder, & 
Wohrmann; 2009; cf. Nadarevic & Erdfelder, in press).3 In one classic study, 
people read a description about a woman called Jane (Snyder & Cantor, 1979). 
Some of  the information was in line with the idea that Jane could be an introvert 
(“Jane refrained from socializing during her coffee break”) and some information 
was in line with the idea that Jane could be an extrovert (“Jane didn’t hesitate to 
speak to strangers when jogging”). Two days later subjects described her suitability 
for a job as a real estate agent or a librarian. Subjects who evaluated Jane for the 
librarian role recalled more information in support of  the idea that Jane was 
introverted. Likewise, subjects who evaluated Jane for the real estate role recalled 
more information in support of  the idea that Jane was extroverted. Put simply: 
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3 Although the research in this thesis is my own, I conducted it in a lab and supervised a team comprised of research assistants and 
honors students. I also received advice and direction from my supervisors and collaborators. Therefore, I often use the word "we" in 
this thesis to reflect that fact. As you will also see, I use the word "we" in a different context to refer to what is known (or not known) in 
the wider scientific community.
people tended to recall information that was consistent with their hypothesis (see 
also positive test strategy; Klayman & Ha, 1987).
 So given the claim “Stephen King is alive,” you might be inclined to mentally 
test the hypothesis that he is indeed alive: You “see” recent images of  him, “hear” 
him on NPR, or “remember” seeing advertisements for his latest book. The 
fluency with which you generate these alive-consistent thoughts and images may 
bolster their perceived currency.  And so you conclude that the claim is true.
But now suppose you evaluate the claim “Nick Cave is alive.” If  you are like 
most people in my studies, his name is unfamiliar to you and you know little to 
nothing about Nick Cave. You might think “Nick Cave? Not sure if  I’ve heard of  
him. I have no idea if  he’s alive.” You might be unable to conjure thoughts and 
images to help you evaluate whether the claim is true. Your only recourse would 
be to guess. But nonprobative information can affect people’s guesses in the 
moment. Indeed, several lines of  research lead to the idea that when a claim 
appears with a photograph like the one of  Nick Cave in Figure 1.1, the photo 
might bias people to guess that the claim is true.  
Repetition and Truth.
A large literature on repetition and truth demonstrates how nonprobative 
information can signal truth and systematically bias people’s judgements. In these 
experiments, subjects typically see a series of  statements at time 1, then at time 2 
they see some of  those statements again along with some new statements (Begg et 
al., 1992; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). Even when statements have been 
presented in a way to discredit them at time 1, repeated statements are rated true 
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more often when they appear again at time 2 (Begg et al., 1992; see Dechêne, 
Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). Over the last two decades, numerous studies have 
replicated this finding and illuminated the mechanisms that contribute to the 
illusory truth effect (Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007; Dechêne, Stahl, 
Hansen, & Wänke, 2009 ).  
The leading explanation for this boost in perceived truth is that repeating 
information increases the ease or cognitive fluency with which people can process 
the statement when they encounter it again—and people interpret an experience 
of  cognitive fluency as a cue to truth (Begg et al., 1992; Unkelbach, 2007; Reber 
& Unkelbach, 2010). Put another way, seeing a statement at time 1, helps it spring 
to mind later at time 2. But this feeling of  easy processing can be manufactured in 
the moment and an illusion of  truth can happen without having seen a statement 
earlier (Reber & Schwarz, 1999). For instance, in one study, subjects judged the 
truth of  a series of  statements. The key manipulation was that some of  those 
statements were presented in high colour contrast (say, dark blue on a white 
background) and some were presented in low colour contrast (say, yellow on a 
white background). Although colour was unrelated to the objective truth status of  
the statements, those statements presented in high colour contrast were rated as 
true more often. This finding fits with the idea that the illusion of  truth effect is 
not tied to prior exposure per se, but rather that prior exposure facilitates 
processing of  the statement at time 2.
Moreover, people will make sense of  this increase in processing ease 
depending on the experimental context (Whittlesea, 1993; see Schwarz, 2010). 
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When given the task of  judging truth (as in the experiments described above), 
people may interpret ease of  processing as a signal that something is familiar and 
likely true (Unkelbach, 2007), but when given the task of  judging preferences or 
fame, people may interpret ease of  processing as a signal that something is 
preferred or famous (see for example Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; 
Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987). So how might a single exposure to a 
photo boost processing ease?
Conceptual Fluency and Cognitive Availability.
We know from studies of  cognitive fluency that presenting information in a 
semantically rich context can facilitate conceptual processing and lead to illusions 
of  familiarity in the moment. For example, people more often claim they studied a 
target word (“boat”) earlier when the test word appears in a semantically 
predictive sentence (“The stormy seas tossed the boat”) rather than in a neutral 
sentence (“He saved up his money and bought a boat;” Whittlesea, 1993). The 
semantically predictive context is thought to help people anticipate the final word, 
producing unexpectedly fluent conceptual processing, which they take as evidence 
of  familiarity—leading them to say they had recently seen the word. This finding 
also fits with literature on cognitive availability: Repeated or semantically primed 
information is easily retrieved from memory and people often conclude 
(sometimes falsely) that easy retrieval signals frequency, familiarity, and truth (Begg 
et al., 1992; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Whittlesea, 
2011). 
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   This literature suggests that in a single presentation, photos might provide a 
semantically rich context, making details about an otherwise unfamiliar name feel 
more cognitively available and in the 
context of  a true/false judgment, make 
the concept described in the claim seem 
true. To understand our thinking, 
reconsider the claim about Nick Cave, but 
this time look at the photo in Figure 1.1 
Suddenly you know a little more about 
him. You might think “He’s probably 
some kind of  entertainer—he is dressed in a suit, I see a microphone. His stance 
makes it look like he could be singing...” The photo is related to the claim and 
nonprobative—it does not tell you whether Nick Cave is alive—but information 
you glean from that photo might nonetheless boost cognitive availability and help 
you process the claim more fluently4.
Imagery and Reality Monitoring.
Related lines of  research show that when people can easily imagine a target 
claim they often conclude—only moments later—that it is more likely (Sherman, 
Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985; see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009 for a 
review). In one study, subjects read about an illness that had easy to imagine 
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4 It is of course possible that photos would not affect people’s judgments in the moment. The cognitive fluency literature also tells us 
that if people can readily identify the source of processing fluency, they will correctly attribute the experience of processing ease to its 
source (in this case, a photo) rather than misattribute the ease of processing to the task at hand (see Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; 
Oppenheimer, 2004; Schwarz, 2010). Without a time delay, or another manipulation that would obscure the potential influence of a 
photo, we might find that photos do not affect people’s judgments of  truth.
Figure 1.1 Example of materials from Experiment 1-2. 
Photo credit Josep M Martí, Creative Commons 
License. 
Nick Cave
symptoms, such as a headache or low energy or difficult to imagine symptoms 
such as an inflamed liver or a malfunctioning nervous system (Sherman et al.). 
When they were asked to rate the likelihood that they would contract the disease 
in the future, those who tried to imagine the easy symptoms said it was more likely 
than those who imagined the difficult symptoms. This effect extends to other 
domains of  judgement; the easier it was for people to mentally image a travel 
destination, the more people expressed interest in visiting that destination (Petrova 
& Cialdini, 2005). Together these findings fit with the Reality Monitoring Framework
—when our mental experience is rich with perceptual features and springs to 
mind easily it feels real; we are more likely to conclude that it is a true experience 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981). Photos should provide the raw materials for imagery, 
thereby facilitating generation of  the rich perceptual and conceptual details 
people typically interpret as cues to reality (e.g., Johnson, 2006). 
Moreover, people are inclined to trust photos, which are often the best 
evidence that something actually occurred (Kelly & Nace, 1994). In one study, 
people rated the believability of  (fake) articles and photos attributed to either the 
New York Times or the National Enquirer. Perhaps unsurprisingly, people rated 
content from the New York Times as more believable. And although they rated 
articles from the National Enquirer as relatively low in believability, they 
nonetheless believed the photos presented in that same publication (Kelly & Nace). 
Put another way, people trust photos even when they do not trust the source in 
which they appear. So even if  photos do not provide probative evidence for a 
target claim (like the photo in Figure 1.1), they might nonetheless boost belief  in 
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the claim because photos are inherently credible themselves. In a particularly 
worrisome example of  this sort of  bias, students rated the scientific reasoning of  a 
neuroscience article more favorably if  the article included an image of  the brain 
(McCabe & Castel, 2008; although see Farah & Hook 2012; Michael, Newman, 
Vuorre, Cumming, & Garry, 2013 for evidence that the power of  a brain image 
may have been overstated).
This body of  research suggests that photos might boost the truthiness of  
claims by bootstrapping the generation of  related ideas and images, or by creating 
an aura of  plausibility simply because people find photos to be credible. Many 
studies have demonstrated that imagination or repeated exposure to claims, can—
over time—produce illusions of  truth, belief, and memory (Bernstein, 2005; 
Brown & Marsh, 2008; Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Lindsay, 
Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). But we propose that a claim coupled with a 
related but nonprobative photo might, in the moment, combine with confirmation 
bias to produce immediate truthiness (cf. Hansen & Wanke, 2010).
Trawling for Confirming Evidence.
Another way nonprobative photos might promote truthiness is that people 
might "trawl" through the photo, selectively interpreting information they find as 
support for a default bias to see the claim as true (Clark & Chase, 1972; Gilbert et 
al., 1993; Nickerson, 1998; Richter et al., 2009; cf. Nadarevic & Erdfelder, in 
press). Indeed a large body of  work shows that people will not only recall 
information through the lens of  a hypothesis, belief, or expectation (see, for 
example, Assefi & Garry, 2003; Bartlett, 1932; Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 
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1932; Snyder & Cantor, 1979), but they will also interpret new information to fit 
with a hypothesis at hand. In one study, some people were led to believe that a 
child came from a low socioeconomic background, while others were led to 
believe that a child came from a high socioeconomic background (Darley & Gross, 
1983). Then half  of  the subjects watched a video showing the child taking a test. 
Those who saw the video used information in the video to support their 
hypothesis about the child: people who learned that the child was from a high 
socioeconomic background thought the child did better on the test than those who 
learned the child was from a low socioeconomic background. Moreover, people 
who learned that the child was from a high socioeconomic background also 
reported seeing more positive behaviours in the video. That is, although everyone 
saw the same video, groups interpreted the evidence in the video through the lens 
of  their own hypothesis.  
Taken together, this research suggests that in assessing the claim that Nick 
Cave is alive people might mine and interpret information from the photo that 
confirms the hypothesis at hand. For instance, just as with the video of  the child, 
someone might look at the photo in Figure 1.1 to confirm a hypothesis. They 
might think, “...his hair style looks like it is from the 70’s, but the microphone 
looks new which might mean he performed recently, so perhaps he is alive.” 
Relatedly, the ease with which photos make this selective interpretation possible 
might also steer people away from spending extra effort to consider reasons why 
the claim is false (see Gilbert et al., 1993).
17 
Overview
 In the first two experiments, we showed people familiar and unfamiliar 
celebrity names; half  the celebrities were alive and half  were dead. Celebrity 
names appeared with or without a photo of  them engaged in their profession. For 
each name, we asked some subjects to judge the truth of  the claim “This famous 
person is alive.”  The photos depicted celebrities alive, which might be taken as 
evidence of  celebrities being alive. Therefore, we asked another group of  subjects 
to respond to the claim “This famous person is dead.” If  photos help boost 
cognitive availability of  related thoughts and images, or help people trawl for and 
selectively interpret information in line with their hypothesis about unfamiliar 
celebrities, then photos should increase the truthiness of  claims about those 
celebrities, regardless of  whether the claim is that the celebrity is alive or dead (cf. 
Unkelbach, 2007).
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Chapter 2
Experiment 1A and 1B
Method
Subjects
 In Experiment 1A, 92 undergraduate psychology students from Victoria 
University of  Wellington participated for course credit. In Experiment 1B, 48 
undergraduate psychology students from the University of  Victoria, Canada, 
participated for optional bonus points.
Design
For Experiments 1A and 1B we used a 2 (photograph: yes, no) x 2 (familiarity: 
familiar, unfamiliar) x 2 (claim: alive, dead) mixed design, manipulating 
photograph and familiarity within subjects and claim between subjects.  
Procedure
Based on data from preliminary norming, we assembled sets of  low- and 
moderate-familiarity celebrity names; for brevity we refer to these as 
“unfamiliar”and “familiar” celebrities. Half  of  these celebrities were alive, and 
names of  dead and alive celebrities were equal on familiarity (on a 5-point scale, 
MAlive = 2.89, SDAlive = .62, MDead = 2.87, SDDead = .58), and represented a similar 
range of  eras and professions.5
We used Macintosh iBook G4 computers and PsyScope software to present 80 
celebrity names—40 familiar and 40 unfamiliar—to subjects. Names appeared, 
individually, in large black font against a white background. On half  the trials, 
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5 See Table 1 in Appendix A  for a complete set of  these names.
subjects saw a photo of  the celebrity engaged in his or her profession. For 
example, like the photo of  Nick Cave, an Australian singer and musician, 
performing with a microphone in his hand (see Figure 1.1).
The order of  names was randomized for each subject and counterbalanced to 
appear equally often with or without a photo, orthogonal to the alive/dead and 
low/high familiarity variables. Subjects learned that sometimes they would see a 
photo and sometimes they would not. We did not provide any further instructions 
about how they should use the photo. As each name or name-photo pair 
appeared, we asked half  our subjects to decide the truth of  the claim “This 
famous person is alive” and the other half  to decide the truth of  the claim “This 
famous person is dead.” We asked subjects to respond “...as quickly as possible, 
but not so quickly that you start making errors” and asked them to respond within 
3 seconds.6
Experiment 1B, a replication, followed the same procedure with new sets of  
“unfamiliar” and “familiar” celebrities assembled after new norming with 
Canadian students. Subjects saw 84 celebrity names, presented using E-Prime 
Software on PCs.
20 
6 In Experiment 1A, we did not record data for trials when responses exceeded 3 seconds, which happened on 9.62% of trials, but in 
Experiment 1B we recorded and analyzed all response times. Also, because of a programming error, two celebrity names appeared in 
the incorrect counterbalance; we excluded those names from analyses, but we find the same (significant) pattern of results when we 
include them. 
Results and Discussion
We calculated people’s bias (c) to say a claim was true (Stanislaw & Todorov, 
1999).7 Figure 2.1 shows that across Experiments 1A and 1B, the black bars are 
relatively more negative (lower values of  c) than the gray bars, indicating that 
pairing a claim with a photo led people to be more inclined to say that the claim 
was true. Moreover, this truthiness effect was most pronounced for unfamiliar 
names.
That is, a mixed repeated measures (photograph: yes, no) x 2 (familiarity: 
familiar, unfamiliar) x 2 (claim: alive, dead) ANOVA showed that there was a main 
effect for photo: relative to the no photo control, people were more biased to say 
true when photos accompanied names (Experiment 1A, F(1, 90) = 4.87, p = .03,  
ηp2 = .05; Experiment 1B, F(1, 46) = 10.53, p < .01, ηp2  = .19). In both 
experiments the effect of  photos tended to be larger for unfamiliar names 
(Experiment 1A, tunfamiliar (91) = 2.21, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .23; Experiment 1B, 
tunfamiliar (47) = 3.74, p < .01 , d = .56) than for familiar names (Experiment 1A, 
tfamiliar (91) = 1.02, p = .31, d = .11; Experiment 1B, tfamiliar (47) = 1.25, p = .22, d  
= .19), although the Photo x Familiarity interaction was significant only in 
21 
7  In all of the experiments described in this thesis, people have the task of deciding whether a series of claims are true or false. I 
analyzed people’s performance on these tasks using Signal Detection Theory (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Wickens, 2002). The main 
measure of interest was people’s tendency to respond that a statement is true—their response bias. People’s ability to discriminate 
between true and false statements (d’) is not the focus of this set of experiments, but I have nonetheless reported these data in full in the 
appendices. In the experiments reported here I used c to measure people’s response bias. c is a measure in standard deviation units, of 
the distance between people’s criterion to say a claim is true and the point at which people’s response bias is neutral. Two of the key 
assumptions of SDT are that the signal and noise distributions are normal and have the same standard deviation. Often these 
assumptions are sound, but given the low item numbers in some of the experiments reported here, I calculated the total proportion of 
true responses for each condition and ran parallel analyses for each experiment (see Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Wickens, 2002). I find 
the same pattern of results. For consistency I report analyses of c for each experiment and note the parallel analysis of the proportion 
of true responses in a footnote for each experiment.  Table 2 in Appendix B provides a brief summary of the results of parallel d’ 
analyses.
Experiment 1B, F(1, 46) = 5.40, p = .03, ηp2 = .11, not in Experiment 1A, F(1, 90) 
<18. 
Truthiness or aliveness? 
Recall that the photos provided evidence of  the celebrities being alive, so we 
might expect that the photos would produce an alive bias, rather than a truth bias. 
But photos promoted a truth bias regardless of  the claim people responded to. 
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8 For Experiment 1A we found the same significant pattern of results when we analyzed the total true proportions: there was a main 
effect for photo F(1,90)= 3.86, p = .05, ηp2 = 04, a main effect for claim F(1,90) = 13.57, p < .01, ηp2 = .13, and a significant Claim x 
Familiarity interaction F(1, 90) = 12.39, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.12. All other interactions F < 1.  For Experiment 1B we found the same 
significant pattern of results when we analyzed the total true proportions: there was Photo x Familiarity interaction F(1,46) = 7.05, p 
= .01, ηp2 = 0.13, a main effect for claim F(1,46) = 4.79, p = .03., ηp2 = 0.09, and a non-significant Photo x Claim x Familiarity 
interaction F(1,46) = 2.81, p = .10, ηp2= 0.06. All other interactions F < 1.
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Figure 2.2. Bias for claims about familiar and unfamiliar names (in Experiments 1a-1b) presented with or 
without a photograph and collapsed across dead/alive factor. Negative value of c is a bias to say true. In Experiments 
1a-2, photos (or words) affected bias for unfamiliar names. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals 
for the photo/no-photo effect at each level of familiarity/difficulty (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
That is, claim (dead or alive) did not interact with photos (F < 2).  There was a 
non-significant Photo x Familiarity x Claim interaction in Experiment 1B, F(1, 46) 
= 2.62, p = .11, ηp2 = .05; this interaction was also non-significant in Experiment 
1A, F < 1.
Interestingly, people tended to find “Alive” claims true more often than 
“Dead” claims. In Experiment 1A, this pattern was most pronounced for familiar 
names (Familiarity x Claim interaction, F(1, 90) = 13.05, p < .01, ηp2 = .13; tfamiliar 
(91) = 4.63, p < .01, d = .98, tunfamiliar (91) < 1). In Experiment 1B a similar 
tendency occurred for all names, F(1, 46) = 3.94, p = .05, ηp2 = .08. This finding 
suggests that people may have attributed the familiarity of  the famous names to 
celebrities being alive. Perhaps this tendency would be reduced if  we showed 
people non-famous names, rather than famous names.
As predicted, photos led to a truth bias for unfamiliar celebrity names. These 
results fit with a mechanism relating to cognitive availability: Photos might 
promote truthiness because they provide a rich semantic context that facilitates the 
generation of  thoughts and images relating to the claim. But these results also fit 
with the idea that feelings of  truthiness arose because photos are inherently 
credible or that over time people have come to associate photos with the 
conclusion that something is real and true (cf. Unkelbach, 2007). People often 
regard photos as evidence of  reality. Indeed, Kelly and Nace (1994) showed that 
people trust photos even when they distrust the source in which they appear (say, 
the National Enquirer). Perhaps related to this finding, McCabe and Castel (2008) 
found that in contrast to photo-realistic images of  the brain, bar graphs did not 
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enhance ratings of  the scientific reasoning in an article (see also Keehner, 
Mayberry, & Fischer, 2011, but cf. Farah & Hook 2012; Michael et al., 2013).  In 
Experiment 2, we examined whether truthiness was tied to the perceived 
credibility of  photos or a learned association between photos and truth: would 
other kinds of  nonprobative information also produce truthiness? To address this 
question, we compared the effect of  photos to the effect of  verbal descriptions of  
those photos. If  these verbal descriptions also produce truthiness, it would suggest 
that when people lack knowledge, anything that makes it easier for people to 
generate thoughts and images related to a claim should bias them toward 
believing that claim.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 2 and 3
Method
Subjects 
Fifty-four undergraduate students from the University of  Victoria, Canada, 
participated for optional bonus points.
Design
We used a 2 (nonprobative information: yes, no) x 2 (format of  nonprobative 
information: photo, verbal) x 2 (claim: alive, dead) mixed design. We manipulated 
the format (photo vs. verbal) and claim (dead vs. alive) between subjects, and 
reduced the design by including only the condition that produces truthiness: 
unfamiliar names.
Procedure
Subjects saw 52 names comprised of  40 critical unfamiliar names from 
Experiment 1B and 12 moderate-familiarity celebrity names. We included a few 
moderate-familiarity names as fillers to make the task easier and more engaging 
for participants.
Half  the subjects saw a photograph of  the celebrity paired with half  the 
names. The other half  saw a verbal description of  the celebrity instead of  a photo. 
We created verbal descriptions for each name by asking two raters to extract 
specific but nonprobative information from each celebrity photo: ethnicity, sex, 
hair, generic occupation, and a career-related concrete noun (for example, the 
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information for Nick Cave would be white male; medium length black straight hair; 
musician; microphone). 
Regardless of  the format of  the nonprobative information that sometimes 
appeared with celebrity names, subjects had the same task: half  responded to the 
truth of  the claim “This famous person is alive” and the other half  to “This 
famous person is dead.”  All other aspects of  the method were identical to 
Experiment 1B.
Results and Discussion
Figure 3.1 shows that again photos produced truthiness—people responded 
true more often when claims appeared with a photo of  the celebrity, regardless of  
whether people responded to “Alive” or “Dead” claims. Did verbal descriptions 
also produce truthiness? The answer is yes. People responded true more often 
when claims appeared with a verbal description of  the celebrity, regardless of  
whether people responded to “Alive” or “Dead” claims. 
That is, a mixed repeated measures 2 (nonprobative information: yes, no) x 2 
(format of  nonprobative information: photo, verbal) x 2 (claim: alive, dead) 
ANOVA showed a main effect for nonprobative information F(1, 50) = 10.27,  p 
< .01, ηp2 = .17. Claim did not interact with the presence or format of  
nonprobative information (all Fs < 1).9
These findings show that truthiness is not tied to the perceived credibility of  
photos.  Instead these results point to a more general mechanism whereby 
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9 For Experiment 2 we found the same significant pattern of results when we analyzed the total true proportions: there was main effect 
of Nonprobative Information F(1, 50) = 14.33, p < .01. ηp2 = 0.22, and a non-significant main effect for claim F(1,50) = 1.11, p = .
30, ηp2 = .02. All other interactions F < 1.
manipulations that facilitate the generation of  related thoughts and images, 
against the backdrop of  a hypothesis confirming stance, lead people to conclude 
that claims are true.  To explore the generalizability of  the effect of  nonprobative 
photos on subjective truth, I tested the hypothesis that general knowledge claims 
(“Turtles are deaf ”) seem truer when paired with a photo that is related to, but 
does not specifically depict, the claim.
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Figure 3.1. Bias for claims about unfamiliar names  (Experiment 2) presented with or without a photograph or 
verbal information, collapsed across dead/alive factor; easy and difficult trivia claims (in Experiment 3) presented with 
or without a photograph . Negative value of c is a bias to say true. In Experiment 2, photos (or words) affected bias for 
unfamiliar names; in Experiment 3, photos affected bias for difficult trivia statements. Error bars show 95% within-
subject confidence intervals for the photo/no-photo effect at each level of familiarity/difficulty (see Masson & Loftus, 
2003).
Experiment 3
Method
Subjects
In Experiment 3, 70 undergraduate psychology students from Victoria 
University of  Wellington participated for course credit.
Design
We used a 2 (photograph: yes, no) x 2 (difficulty: easy, hard) within-subjects 
design. 
Procedure
We used trivia statements from previous research and data from preliminary 
norming to assemble sets of  easy and difficult true/false trivia statements sampling 
general knowledge (Nelson & Narens, 1980; Unkelbach, 2007). People answered 
easy statements correctly 80-100% of  the time, and answered difficult statements 
correctly 40-60% of  the time.10
We used the same presentation and response formats as in the prior 
experiments. On half  the trials, subjects saw a photo that depicted the 
grammatical subject of  the statement, but never provided any diagnostic 
information about whether the statement was true. For example, the claim that 
“Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches” appeared with 
a photo of  macadamia nuts.
Results and Discussion
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10 See Table 3 in the Appendix C for a full list of  all the Trivia Statements used in Experiment 3.
As Figure 3.1 shows, photos had the same effect as in our prior experiments: 
relative to when the trivia claims were presented without a photo, when people 
saw a related, but nonprobative photos paired with trivia claims they were more 
likely to conclude that the claims were true. That is, truthiness generalizes to 
general knowledge claims.
A repeated measures 2 (photograph: yes, no) x 2 (difficulty: easy, hard) 
ANOVA showed a main effect of  photo F(1, 69) = 6.65, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. 
Although the interaction between photo and difficulty did not reach significance, 
F(1, 69) = 1.82, p = .18, follow-up analyses support a similar conclusion to 
Experiments 1A and 1B, in that the effect of  photos was most pronounced when 
people evaluated difficult rather than easy claims, tdifficult (69) = 3.16, p <.01, d  = .
39, teasy (69) = .85, p = .40, d = .10.11
 Although Figures 2.1 and 3.1 suggest that Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2 might 
be interpreted as showing that that photos move people towards a neutral bias, 
Experiment 3 shows that photos move people towards truthiness. In Experiment 
3, even without photos people had a tendency to respond that claims were true, 
yet photos still promoted truthiness.
Summary of  Experiments 1-3
Across four experiments, nonprobative photos inflated truthiness. It is arguably 
unsurprising that photos inflated the truth of  “Alive” claims: Photos depicted 
celebrities alive, and should have facilitated imagery of  those celebrities doing 
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11 For Experiment 3 we found the same significant pattern of results when we analyzed the total true proportions: there was main 
effect of photo F(1,69) = 9.68, p < .01,  ηp2 = 0.12, and a Photo x Difficulty interaction F(1, 69) = 3.54, p  = .06, ηp2 = .05. All other 
effects F < 1.
various things—all possible evidence of  aliveness. The fascinating finding is that 
the same photos inflated the truthiness of  “Dead” claims: Photos did not produce 
an "alive bias," but a "truth bias." Moreover, the truthiness effect generalized 
beyond Dead or Alive judgements: Nonprobative photos enhanced the subjective 
truth of  general knowledge claims, too. 
  The finding that nonprobative verbal information also inflated truthiness 
suggests that the effect of  photos on subjective truth is driven not simply by a 
perception that photos are inherently trustworthy.  We speculate that nonprobative 
photos and verbal information help people generate pseudoevidence (cf. Kelly & 
Nace, 1994).  People may selectively trawl and interpret information gleaned from 
a photo or description as consistent with their hypothesis and/or they may use 
such information to cue the mental generation of  thoughts and images consistent 
with their hypothesis. It is also possible that the ease or fluency with which people 
bring related information (even partial or incomplete details) to mind contributes 
to a feeling of  truthiness. Although we cannot determine which of  these 
mechanisms underlies the truthiness effect, across four experiments our data 
suggest a general mechanism whereby the availability of  related but nonprobative 
information promotes truthiness of  unfamiliar claims.
Considered as a whole, our findings suggest that even without repeated 
exposures or instructions to imagine, the mere presence of  nonprobative 
information such as photos might rapidly inflate the perceived truth of  many types  
of  true and false claims (cf. Brown & Marsh, 2008; Lindsay et al., 2004). Of  
course, these effects are not qualitatively new phenomena, but are instead 
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intriguing new exemplars of  a growing family of  effects related to inferences 
(perhaps unconscious inferences) about the mental generation of  hypothesis-
consistent evidence (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Johnson, 2006; Schwarz, 
2010; Whittlesea, 2011).  In addition, the effect of  nonprobative photos seems to 
be quite robust. A robust effect is, of  course, an essential tool for the development 
of  theory and mechanism, which is what I explore in the next set of  experiments. 
Under what conditions do photos produce truthiness?
Both the trawling and conceptual fluency mechanisms (which are not mutually 
exclusive) hinge on the relationship between the photo and the claim. But consider 
now the right panel of  Figure 3.2. There is, of  course, no obvious semantic 
relationship between a thermometer and a lizard. What might be the effect of  
such a pairing on your answer? This is the question we address in the next three 
experiments we present here, as part of  our ongoing exploration of  the 
mechanisms by which photos lead to truthiness.
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Figure 3.2 Example of related and unrelated photos and associated trivia claims. Thermometer photo courtesy of 
Andres Rueda, and Skink photo courtesy of William Cho; Creative Commons license.
There are reasons to predict that relative to related photos, unrelated photos 
should cause disfluency.12 That is, unrelated photos should make it more difficult 
for people to bring related thoughts and images to mind. For instance, in one 
study, when people saw a target word that was semantically unrelated to a 
preceding sentence (“The librarian reached for the top shelf  and pulled down a 
book” “napkin”), they rated that target word as less pleasant than when they saw a 
target that was semantically related (“read”; Lee & Labroo, 2004).  One 
explanation for this effect is that the semantically related sentence helped subjects 
more quickly identify and comprehend the subsequent target word, whereas the 
semantically unrelated sentence prepared subjects for a meaning that mismatched 
the target. Put another way, the semantically unrelated words were relatively 
disfluent compared to their semantically related counterparts.
Parallel effects occur with perceptual manipulations; degraded images, difficult 
fonts, and low contrast colors can lead people to invest more cognitive effort to 
make sense of  stimuli and people tend to be evaluate these stimuli more negatively 
(Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughan, 2011; Petrova & Cialdini, 2005; 
Reber & Schwarz 1999; see Yue, Castel, & Bjork, in press). In the context of  a 
truth judgment, additional cognitive effort might be taken as a signal that the 
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12 It is difficult to make a prediction comparing claims presented with unrelated photos to claims presented without a photo because I 
know of no equivalent no photo (“baseline”) condition in the fluency literature. Some studies have included a similar baseline 
condition. For instance, in one study, people were primed with correct, incorrect, or unrelated answers to trivia claims (Kelley & 
Lindsay, 1993). Compared to unrelated answers, correct answers boosted people’s accuracy and incorrect answers hurt people’s 
accuracy. But it is difficult to make a prediction from this study: would our claims presented with unrelated photos look more like the 
incorrect condition or more like the unrelated condition? Relatedly, is hard to tell which of these conditions would be most similar to 
our no photo baseline. Nonetheless, it makes sense that compared to claims presented without a photo, claims presented with unrelated 
photos should feel disfluent. Indeed, I find it hard to think of a mechanism that would make claims paired with unrelated photos seem 
more conceptually fluent than a baseline condition in which claims were presented without photos.
information they are evaluating is false.13 Thus, if  unrelated photos lead to 
disfluent processing, we should expect they would produce falsiness. That is, 
nonprobative, unrelated information should cause people to disbelieve a claim. 
But there are also reasons to predict that unrelated photos would not cause 
falsiness. As we suggested earlier, when people are making a true/false decision 
they might trawl through and selectively interpret information from a related 
photo as evidence that the claim is true. It seems unlikely that people would 
engage in this “trawling” strategy with unrelated photos. It makes no sense to 
search a photo of  a lizard for evidence about magnesium’s putative role in 
thermometers. Moreover, we know from research on the confirmation bias that if  
people encounter information inconsistent with the hypothesis at hand, they often 
ignore it, allocate less weight to that evidence, or even distort it to fit with their 
hypothesis (Darley & Gross, 1983; Kuhn, 1989; Snyder & Cantor, 1979; see 
Nickerson, 1998, for a review). Other research shows that adding related 
nonprobative information can sway people’s judgments about others, but that 
adding irrelevant information produces the same effect as giving people no 
information at all (Gill, Swann, & Silvera, 1998). Thus, a trawling mechanism 
would predict that unrelated photos would have little if  any effect on people’s 
decisions.
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13 Recent research also suggests that an experience of disfluency can reduce confirmation bias (Hernandez & Preston, in press). Thus 
if  an unrelated photo produces a feeling of  disfluency it might also dissuade people from pursuing evidence that a claim is true.
Chapter 4
Based on these considerations, we examined the effects of  semantically related 
and unrelated photos in three experiments. We showed people a series of  trivia 
claims that, within-subjects, appeared with or without a photo that was or was not 
semantically related to the claim.
Experiment 4
Method
Subjects
 In Experiment 4, we used Amazon Mechanical Turk14 (MTurk; 
www.mturk.com/mturk) to recruit subjects in the US. We predetermined a sample 
size of  200 subjects based on pilot testing. Because of  a quirk in the way MTurk 
assigns subject slots, 208 subjects completed the experiment (similar deviations 
follow in the other experiments we report here). They received a $0.60 Amazon 
credit. 
Design
We manipulated one within-subjects factor called photo, with three levels 
(related photo, unrelated photo, no photo).
Procedure
We used trivia statements from previous research to assemble sets of  difficult 
true/false trivia statements sampling general knowledge (Newman et al., 2012; see 
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14  Mechanical Turk is an online subject pool. Turk workers complete experiments and surveys and are given small amounts of 
Amazon credit (e.g. $0.60) that they can use to purchase things on amazon.com. These subjects are diverse and the data from studies 
run online using Mechanical Turk produce similar results to those run in a laboratory (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Germine, 
Nakayama, Duchaine, Chabris, Chatterjee, & Wilmer, 2012; Mason & Suri, 2011).
also Nelson & Narens, 1980; Unkelbach, 2007). People typically answer these 
statements correctly 40-60% of  the time. 
We used Qualtrics software to present 40 trivia claims to subjects. We told 
subjects that sometimes they would see a photo with these claims, and sometimes 
they would not. We did not provide any instructions about how they should use 
the photo. Instead, we asked subjects to decide the truth of  the claim “...as quickly 
as possible, but not so quickly that you start making errors.” 
The claims appeared, individually, in large black font against a white 
background. To orient people to the task, for the first 16 trials they saw easy trivia 
claims (which tend to be answered correctly 80-100% of  the time). Half  these easy 
claims appeared with a related photograph, half  with no photograph. To ensure 
the practice phase did not teach subjects a rule about the relationship between 
truth and the presence of  photos, we paired photos equally often with true and 
false statements.
Immediately after these easy practice trivia claims, the experimental phase 
began. Subjects saw 24 difficult trivia claims. For one third of  trials, a related 
nonprobative photo depicted the grammatical subject of  the statement (e.g., the 
claim, “Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches” 
appeared with a photo of  macadamia nuts). For another third of  trials, a 
semantically unrelated nonprobative photo appeared with the claim (for instance, 
the claim about macadamia nuts appeared with a photo of  a trash can). For the 
other third of  the trials, people saw trivia claims presented without a photo. We 
used the set of  related nonprobative photos from Newman et al., (2012) and 
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created a new set of  semantically unrelated nonprobative photos for the three 
experiments reported here. A semantically unrelated photo was selected for each 
trivia claim. As a set, the unrelated photos represented a similar range of  living 
and non-living objects as the original set of  related photos from Newman et al. 
None of  the photos revealed the accuracy of  the trivia claims. We randomized the 
order of  claims for each subject, and counterbalanced so that claims appeared 
equally often with a related photo, unrelated photo or no photo. We used an 
online script to assign subjects to conditions randomly.
Results & Discussion
Our primary aim was to examine the effects of  semantic relatedness on 
truthiness and falsiness. To address this question we first calculated people’s bias 
(C) to say a claim was true (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).15 As the left panel of  
Figure 4.1 shows, pairing a claim with a related nonprobative photo produced 
truthiness (as shown by the relatively lower value of  C). But the figure also shows 
that the semantic relationship mattered: Unrelated photos did not produce 
truthiness; instead, trials with unrelated photos behaved more like trials with no 
photos. 
Consistent with the pattern displayed in the figure, a one-way ANOVA of  C 
showed a main effect for photo F(2, 206) = 4.10, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. Although 
related photos produced more bias to say true than unrelated photos or no photos,  
bias for unrelated and no photos was similar, trelated-unrelated (207) = 2.30, p = .02, d 
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15 Because we had relatively few trials in Experiment 1, we also calculated the proportion of true responses for each photo condition 
and ran a parallel analysis. We found the same significant pattern of results: there was a main effect for photo F(2, 206) = 5.50, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .05; t related-unrelated (207) = 2.38, p = .02, t related-no photo(207) = 3.29, p < .01, t unrelated-no photo (207) = .89, p = .37. 
Additional d’ analyses appear in Appendix D.
= .16, t related-no photo(207) = 2.77, p = .01, d = .20, tunrelated-no photo (207) = .47, p = .
64, d = .04. These effects (as well as effects and patterns throughout this thesis) 
replicated in a subsequent experiment using the same materials and procedures 
with 204 subjects; see Appendix E). 
The finding that related, but not unrelated, photos produced truthiness 
replicates our earlier work and fits with the idea that unrelated photos would not 
affect people’s true/false decisions.16 At first glance, this result is at odds with the 
prediction that unrelated photos might produce disfluency; after all, presenting 
unrelated photos in the context of  other related photos should have made the 
accompanying trivia claims feel especially incongruent  (Dechêne et al.,  2009; 
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16 We wondered if unrelated photos did not produce falsiness because the combination of the practice task (comprised of related and 
no photos) and experiment proper meant that unrelated photos occurred rarely. The answer is no, as we detail in the replications that 
appear in Appendix E.
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Figure 4.1. Bias for difficult trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically related 
or unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals for the photo factor for Experiment 4  (see Masson & Loftus, 2003)
Westerman, 2008). But it is possible that this context led subjects to find a 
semantic relationship between the claim and the photo, for both types of  photos. 
For instance, they might have looked at the thermometer claim paired with a 
lizard, and thought “Well, the lizard is long and thin, like a thermometer, and has 
a stripe up the center just like a thermometer.” Such a strategy would have 
mitigated the perceived incongruency between the photos and trivia claims, 
leading unrelated photos to become more like related photos and diluting their 
falsiness. This idea fits with research showing that people will find or create 
meaning (Bartlett, 1932), especially when they are faced with pairings that don’t 
have an obvious semantic relationship (for instance, novel metaphors; Grimshaw, 
Stewart, & Lauwereyns, 2011; Lynott & Connell, 2010). 
Of  course, a critic might argue that unrelated photos produced little bias 
compared to no photos for other, less interesting reasons: Perhaps people just 
adopted a strategy of  ignoring unrelated photos, much like the way people in a 
Stroop task can adopt a strategy to ignore the word and focus on the color (Kane 
& Engle, 2003; Stroop, 1935; see also Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997). This 
strategy seems possible, but is unlikely on closer consideration. Because the 
unrelated photos randomly appeared among related photos, people must have 
processed photos enough to understand that they were unrelated. The response 
time data from our pilot testing fits with this idea. Although we did not collect 
response time data in the experiments we report here, response times in our lab-
based pilot testing showed that subjects took longer to respond to claims presented 
with photos (F photo(1, 128) = 12.36, p < .01, ηp2  = .09;  Mrelated condition photo = 
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4612.37ms, SD = 1926.83ms; Mrelated condition no photo = 4357.62ms, SD 
=1344.80ms; Munrelated condition photo = 4957.40ms, SD = 1624.02ms; Munrelated condition 
no photo = 4470.93ms, SD =1382.88ms). Moreover, people took a similar amount of 
time to respond to claims paired with related and unrelated photos (although 
directionally, people took longer to respond to claims with unrelated photos, this 
pattern did not reach significance, Frelatedness (1, 128) <1, Frelatedness x photo (1, 128) = 
1.21, p = .27, ηp2  = .01). Thus, the "ignoring" hypothesis does not seem 
satisfactory.
Taken together, these findings suggest that in the context of  related photos, 
unrelated photos exert the same influence as no photos. But part of  this context 
likely includes subjects’ expectations that each photo is meaningfully related to a 
claim. Might that expectation modulate the effect of  unrelated photos? If  we 
minimized subjects’ expectations about meaningful relationships between photos 
and claims, what then should be the effect of  unrelated photos? One possibility is 
that unrelated photos would make it more difficult for people to bring related 
ideas to mind, producing disfluent processing. If  so, we should see increased 
falsiness among subjects for whom photos were always unrelated. A second 
possibility is that setting people up to expect incongruence between photos and 
claims might lead them to ignore all of  the photos, and focus on the claims—a 
strategy that should be much easier to apply when all the photos are unrelated 
(Kane & Engle, 2003). We addressed these questions in Experiment 5 by 
manipulating the semantic relatedness of  photos between-subjects.
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Experiment 5
Method
Subjects
We used MTurk to recruit 196 subjects in the US. They received $0.60 
Amazon credit for participating.
Design
We used a 2 (photo: yes, no) x 2 (relatedness: related, unrelated) mixed design, 
manipulating the presence of  a photo within-subjects and relatedness of  the photo 
between-subjects.
Procedure
We used the same procedure as Experiment 4 with the following changes. 
Immediately after seeing the easy practice trivia claims, people saw 32 difficult 
trivia claims (half  true, half  false). Half  the claims appeared with a photo; for half 
the subjects the photo was always related to the claim whereas for the remaining 
subjects it was always unrelated to the claim with which it appeared.
Results & Discussion
As Figure 4.2 shows, related photos again produced truthiness. But the Figure 
also shows that, in contrast to Experiment 1, unrelated photos produced a 
different pattern. Relative to when claims appeared without a photo, when claims 
appeared with an unrelated photo people were biased to conclude those claims 
were false. That is, unrelated photos produced falsiness.
A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA showed the pertinent Photo x Relatedness interaction, 
F(1, 194) = 9.01, p < .01 ηp2 = .04; related photos produced truthiness, trelated-no 
40 
photo(93) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .23 but unrelated photos produced falsiness, tunrelated-no 
photo (101) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .1917. These patterns replicated in a subsequent 
study in which 185 subjects were tested with the same materials and procedure 
(see Appendix F).
Taken together, Experiments 4 and 5 might lead us to conclude that although 
the effects of  unrelated photos depend on the context in which they appear, 
related photos produce truthiness regardless of  context. But recall that in both of  
these experiments (and in Newman et al., 2012), claims with related photos always 
appeared among claims without photos; the same is true of  claims with unrelated 
photos. Thus we cannot rule out the possibility that truthiness also depends on 
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17 For Experiment 5 we found the same significant pattern of results when we analyzed the total true proportions: there was no main 
effect of Photo F < 1, but there was a significant Photo x Relatedness interaction F (1,194) = 11.31, p < .01, ηp2 = .06; t related-no 
photo(93) = 2.47, p =.02,  t unrelated-no photo (101) = 2.26, p = .03.
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Figure 4.2. Bias for difficult trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically 
related or unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals for the photo effect for related and unrelated conditions in Experiment 5  (see Masson & Loftus, 
2003)
context. That is, perhaps what drives truthiness is that people evaluate their 
processing experiences with photos against the benchmark of  their experiences 
without photos. 
 In fact, a growing body of  research fits with this idea and suggests that a 
feeling of  easy retrieval or easy imagery is driven by a comparison against a 
standard (Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). When it is easier than expected to 
retrieve something, people interpret that processing discrepancy as a cue to truth; 
conversely, when it is more difficult than expected to retrieve something, people 
interpret this discrepancy the opposite way. But when processing matches 
expectations, there is no discrepancy to interpret. Moreover, processing standards 
do not have to arise from sustained prior experiences; instead experimental 
manipulations can forge them in the moment (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Westerman, 
2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b). For example, repetition is thought to 
produce truth because repeated statements are more easily processed, and people 
interpret this processing fluency as a sign that statements are true (Dechêne et al.,  
2010; Unkelbach, 2006). But as is the case with some of  psychological science’s 
well-known effects—such as the illusory truth effect—the effect of  repetition on 
truth disappears when repetition is manipulated between-subjects (Dechêne et al., 
2009; Roediger, 2008). If  truthiness (and falsiness) depends on a standard, we 
should see that the pattern from Experiment 5 disappears when people have no 
standard against which to interpret the ease or difficulty of  processing that 
accompanies claims paired with photos. Accordingly, in Experiment 6 we 
manipulated the photo factor entirely between-subjects. 
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Experiment 6
Method
Subjects
We used MTurk to recruit 301 subjects in the US. They received a $0.60 
Amazon credit.
Design
We used a single-factor (photo: related, unrelated, no photo) between-subjects 
design. 
Procedure
Subjects saw the same trivia claims as in Experiment 5: 16 practice claims, 
followed by 32 trivia claims. The key difference in Experiment 6 is that we 
manipulated the photo factor between-subjects. That is, one third of  subjects saw 
the claims paired with related photos, a third saw the claims paired with unrelated 
photos, and a final third saw the claims paired with no photo. We gave subjects the 
same instructions as in Experiment 4 and 5, except that we removed any reference 
to the presence or absence of  photos.
Results & Discussion
As Figure 4.3 shows, compared to when there was no photo, related photos 
did not produce truthiness, and unrelated photos did not produce falsiness. In 
other words, a one way ANOVA showed no effect for photo, F(2, 298) = .75, p = .
47, ηp2 = .01. 18
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18 For Experiment 6 we found the same non-significant pattern of results when we analyzed the total true proportions: there was no 
main effect of  Photo F(2,298) < 1.
These findings fit with the idea that truthiness or falsiness depend on 
expectations acquired in the experimental context, and only occur when there is a 
discrepancy in the expected ease of  processing.  These patterns replicated in a 
subsequent study in which 301 subjects were tested with the same materials and 
procedure (see Appendix G)  
Summary of  Experiments 4-6
Across three experiments, we found the effects of  nonprobative photos vary 
with experimental context. We also found that the effects of  nonprobative photos 
depend on the semantic relationship between the photo and the claim. When 
there was a no photo standard against which to evaluate either related or 
unrelated photos (Experiment 5), related photos increase the truth of  claims (an 
effect we call truthiness), while unrelated photos decrease the truth of  claims (an 
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Figure 4.3. Bias for difficult trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically 
related or unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals for each cell mean in Experiment 6  (see Masson & Loftus, 2003)
effect we call falsiness). But when we removed that ability to compare against a 
standard by employing a between-subjects design, neither related nor unrelated 
nonprobative photos influenced people’s true/false judgements.  Considered as a 
whole, this pattern of  results suggests that photos influence people’s judgments 
when a discrepancy arises in the expected ease of  processing—that is, when 
subjects find claims with photos easier (or more difficult) to evaluate compared to 
claims without  photos (Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b). 
Moreover, these findings also support a mechanism in which—against a backdrop 
of  an expected standard—related photos help people generate pseudoevidence to 
support the claim. Related photos might help people generate pseudoevidence by 
facilitating conceptual processing and (or) helping people trawl for evidence 
(Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Nickerson, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 
Whittlesea, 2011). Our anecdotal observations of  a small number of  lab-tested 
pilot subjects (who provided think-aloud protocols while performing the procedure 
of  Experiment 5 also fit with such a mechanism. For instance, when faced with the 
claim “Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches” paired 
with a photo of  macadamia nuts, one subject said, “I’m going to go with yes 
because they kind of  look like peaches, so that would make sense.”
The effects of  unrelated photos are less uniform, and suggest that context 
moderates their influence. Although these photos exerted little influence in 
Experiment 1, that they produced falsiness in Experiment 5 suggests that they are 
not always benign or ignored. Indeed, our anecdotal observations again suggest 
that subjects tried to find a relationship between the unrelated photos and claims. 
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For example, regarding the claim “The Mona Lisa has no eyebrows” paired with a 
photo of  a tiger, another think-aloud pilot subject reported, “I noticed . . . that 
tigers don’t really have eyebrows either so it was maybe giving you a bit of  an 
influence.” Interestingly, this subject saw only unrelated photos (as in Experiment 
5), but nonetheless interpreted some of  the photos as being related to the claims at 
hand. In the context of  other semantically related photos, subjects may have been 
even more inclined to search for meaning (Grimshaw, Stewart, & Lauwereyns, 
2011; see also Lynott & Connell, 2010). 
Our findings also fit with a growing body of  work showing that people 
evaluate their processing experience against a standard (Dechêne et al., 2009; 
Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b). When cognitive 
processing is easier (or more difficult) than expected, people make sense of  that 
discrepancy within the current situation—in the context of  a true /false task, they 
take easy processing as a signal that something is true, and take difficult processing 
as a signal that something is false. Still, it is surprising that people did not simply 
discount the influence of  the photos; after all, when people can readily home in on 
the source that causes a discrepancy in processing, they tend to correctly attribute 
the discrepancy to that source (in this case, the photo) rather than misattribute the 
discrepancy to the task at hand (see Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Oppenheimer, 
2004; Schwarz, 2010). Although robust, the effects of  nonprobative photos were 
relatively small in our studies—perhaps because people could easily home in on 
the source of  discrepant processing. One avenue for future research might be to 
make the photo manipulation less obvious—making it more difficult for people to 
46 
identify the photo as being the likely source of  discrepant processing. A 
manipulation like this might work to boost the effects of  photos and truthiness.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
Review
 Over 7 experiments we examined how nonprobative photos (or words) can 
influence people's judgements of  truth. In the first two experiments, we found that 
adding a photograph of  a celebrity (showing them engaged in their profession) 
biased people to say claims about a celebrity were true—regardless of  whether the 
claim was “This famous person is alive” or “This famous person is dead.” 
Moreover, this truthiness effect was most pronounced when people evaluated 
claims about unfamiliar celebrities—that is, when they could not draw on their 
own general knowledge to decide the truth of  a claim. This finding fits with 
research showing that people will draw on tangential cues to inform their 
decisions, especially when they do not have access to other objective or diagnostic 
information (e.g., colour contrast; Unkelbach, 2007).
In Experiment 2, we showed that truthiness was not tied to the perceived 
credibility of  photos, but that giving people verbal descriptions of  those photos 
produced the same effect. In Experiment 3, we examined the generalizability of  
the effect and found that photos that related to—but did not provide evidence for
— general knowledge claims also produced truthiness. Taken together, the first 
four experiments showed that in the moment, related but nonprobative 
information can systematically bias people to conclude claims are true.  
In the next three experiments we examined the conditions under which photos 
would produce truthiness. We found that simply adding information to a claim 
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does not produce truthiness: The semantic relationship between the photo and 
claim matters. Experiment 4 showed that in a within-subject design, related 
photos produced truthiness, but unrelated photos acted just like the no photo 
condition. Experiment 5 showed that unrelated photos were not benign, rather 
that their effects depended on experimental context: In a mixed design, related 
photos produced truthiness and unrelated photos produced falsiness. We also 
found that although truthiness generalized across materials, it did not generalize 
across experimental context: The effect of  photos (related and unrelated) was 
eliminated when we used a fully between-subjects design in Experiment 6.  Taken 
together, our findings suggest that the effect of  nonprobative photos is relative. 
Our data fit with a mechanism in which against an expected standard of  
processing ease, related nonprobative photos can help people generate 
pseudoevidence regarding the truth of  a claim.
Connections with the Broader Literature
Mental Construal
Considered as a whole, these findings are reminiscent of  the literature on 
effects of  mental construal (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). When people ponder 
a target stimulus in a concrete rather than abstract way, they tend to report that 
the target feels subjectively closer in time (or in physical distance) and is more 
likely to be true (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2008; Hansen & Wanke, 2010). Moreover,  
how people represent an event depends on the accessibility of  semantically related 
information: In one study people judged that concrete statements were better 
descriptions of  Los Angeles (“a dry temperate city”), than abstract statements (“a 
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tangle of  freeways”) if  they had been primed to consider Los Angeles earlier in 
the experiment (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2008). Semantically related photos might 
do something similar to the Los Angeles prime, and lead people to construe the 
trivia claim in more concrete terms, boosting its perceived truth. Conversely, 
unrelated photos might lead to abstract construal. 
Reality Monitoring and Vividness
Our findings also fit with research on reality monitoring and vividness. When 
people evaluate the accuracy of  mental events, they make decisions based on the 
characteristics of  the mental event—using the amount of  perceptual detail and 
ease of  imagery as cues to reality (Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Raye, 1981). We 
know that photos can influence reality monitoring even after short exposures. 
Within just a few seconds photos can lead people to say they remember events that 
never happened (Brown & Marsh, 2008; Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 
2011). In one study, people saw a series of  news headlines (true and false) and 
judged whether they remembered the news event described in each headline 
(Strange et al., 2011). Some of  the headlines were presented along with a related 
“stock photo” (for instance: The false headline Blair under fire for botched 
Baghdad rescue attempt; won't step down, was paired with a photo of  Tony Blair 
speaking in parliament). When people saw headlines paired with these stock 
photos, they were more likely to say they remembered the news event—even 
though the photos did not provide any evidence that the event occurred. One 
reason why photos can lead people to make reality monitoring errors, is that they 
should help people manufacture mental contents—images and perceptual details
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—that are usually interpreted as evidence of  truth or memory (Johnson, 2006; 
Johnson & Raye, 1981; see also Lindsay et al., 2004). Together this research 
suggests that photos are not just a cue to truth, but they can be a cue to reality 
more generally.
The literature on vividness also squares with our truthiness effect. Messages 
that are delivered in a vivid way—with concrete language, pictures, and additional 
details—are more persuasive than messages delivered in a less vivid way—with 
abstract language, no images and fewer details (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980; cf. Frey & Eagly, 1993; Taylor & Thompson, 1982). For instance, 
people are more likely to find a defendant guilty when eyewitness testimony is 
delivered with specific ("The man went and got a box of  Milk Duds and a can of  
diet Pepsi"), rather than general details ("The man went and got a few more 
items;" Bell & Loftus, 1989; see also Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980).  One 
explanation for why vivid messages can be persuasive is that they tend to be better 
remembered; making it easier for people to retrieve and picture the message later
—which might also work to bolster the perceived truth of  the message (Collins, 
Taylor, Wood, & Thompson, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Shedler & Manis, 
1986).19 Although vividness effects are usually measured some time after people 
have seen a message, our research suggests that adding nonprobative information 
to claims can have similar effects in the moment.
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19 But evidence for this mechanism is mixed (e.g., Frey & Eagly, 1993) and some research suggests that people’s memory of a vivid 
message does not necessarily predict the persuasive power of  that message (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Shedler & Manis, 1986).
The Seductive Allure of  Brain Images
The effects we report here are not the only demonstration of  how 
nonprobative images can influence people’s beliefs.  For instance, in one well 
known study people agreed more with the conclusions in a news article when it 
featured an image of  the brain, even though that image provided no additional 
evidence for the conclusions already in the text of  the article (McCabe & Castel, 
2008). 
Although this finding has received much attention in both the popular and 
scholarly press (nearly 40 citations per year, according to Google Scholar, as at 
November 21, 2012), when Michael et al. (2013) attempted to extend this work 
and replicate the original study they failed. Instead, Michael and colleagues ran a 
series of  studies—comprising ten experiments and nearly 2,000 subjects to 
estimate, more precisely the effect of  adding a brain image. When the original 
McCabe & Castel (2008) data was combined with data from the 10 replications in 
a meta-analysis, Michael et al. determined that a brain image exerts little to no 
influence on the extent to which people agree with the conclusions of  a news 
article. In fact, the precision in the meta-analysis showed that an effect size of  zero 
remained a plausible true effect size, even though zero is admittedly at the lower 
limit of  the estimate. How do we reconcile the findings of  Michael et al with our 
results that suggest nonprobative photos do indeed have systematic effects on our 
judgments?
Although the effects we report here are small, one might wonder why a photo 
of  Nick Cave or a thermometer increases perceived truth but an image of  the 
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brain does not.  On the one hand we might expect that brain images should exert 
more of  an influence on people's judgments than photos of  people or 
thermometers. We know that people trust neuroscience: Although Michael et al., 
(2013) did not find robust effects of  brain images, they did find that when people 
read explanations of  scientific findings that contained neuroscience people were 
more likely to find those explanations satisfactory than when people read 
explanations without neuroscience (a replication of  Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, 
Rawon, & Gray, 2008; see also McCabe, Castel, & Rhodes, 2011).
On the other hand, the brain images were added to an explanation that 
already contained neuroscience, so it might be that these effects are not additive. 
That is, once people have had their 'hit' of  neuroscience through the text, the 
photo has only a trivial effect on their decisions. Relatedly, in the Michael et al 
study, subjects read 500-word passages paired with a photo of  a brain, whereas in 
the 7 experiments reported here we showed subjects short claims of  approximately 
8 words. It is possible that the longer passage gave people enough semantic 
context so that the effect of  brain images was trivial. That is, nonprobative photos 
might not boost processing any further when they are paired with detailed verbal 
descriptions (see Experiment 2). It is also possible that these more thorough 
descriptions gave people sufficient background knowledge to evaluate the article, 
making people less inclined to draw on brain images to inform their judgments. 
Indeed, in the experiments we report here we found that people were less 
susceptible to the effects of  nonprobative photos when they could draw on general 
knowledge to answer a claim. 
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Of  course it is also possible that the brain image only exerted a trivial effect on 
people’s decisions because the presence of  an image was manipulated between-
subjects. As in the experiments reported here, it is possible that manipulating the 
presence of  a brain image within-subjects would produce larger, more consistent 
effects. 
Avenues for Future Research
Does truthiness stick?
The effects we report here happen in a matter of  seconds: People see a claim 
and respond as quickly as possible to decide if  it is true. Do the effects of  
truthiness fade rapidly, by the time subjects have left our experiment? 
A number of  findings in the psychological literature on memory lead us to 
suspect that truthiness should persist over time. First, we know that photos or 
pictures can help people remember information (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; 
David, 1998; Mayer & Gallini, 1990; Strange et al., 2011; for a review see Carney 
& Levin, 2002; Mayer, 2008). Thus we would expect that compared to when 
people did not see a photo at time 1, photos would help people remember the 
statement at time 2 and should make it feel more cognitively available, familiar 
and true (Jacoby et al, 1989; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Ozubko & Fugelsang, 2011; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Whittlesea, 2011).
Second, people tend to have a good memory for photographs (Paivio, Rogers, 
& Smythe, 1968; Shepard, 1967). So at time 2, even if  people just remember 
elements of  the photo, it may still help them generate related thoughts images 
about the claim in the moment—boosting feelings of  conceptual fluency and 
54 
truth. Third, if  people learn an association between photos and truth at time 1, 
simply remembering that a statement appeared with a photo might lead people to 
conclude the statement is true at time 2 (see for instance, Unkelbach, 2007). So 
perhaps truthiness would persist over time, suggesting that a brief  intervention 
with a nonprobative photo could have persistent effects on our beliefs about the 
world—true and false. 
This kind of  design would also allow us to examine whether photos have any 
special biasing power over other kinds of  nonprobative information. Recall that in 
the experiments reported here, photos and verbal information similarly biased 
people to conclude claims were true. But over time, photos may have more biasing 
power than words. Given that people tend to remember pictures better than 
words, over time the effects of  nonprobative verbal information might fade more 
rapidly than the effects of  nonprobative photos (see Paivio, Rogers, & Smythe, 
1968; Shepard, 1967). 
Are Some People more Susceptible to Truthiness than Others?
We found that truthiness varied according to whether people judged easy or 
difficult claims and across experimental context, but we also found that truthiness 
varied across subjects. That is, not everyone fell victim to the effects of  
nonprobative information. Across our experiments between 60 and 70% of  
people fell victim to truthiness, but a substantial minority did not.
This finding fits with related work on memory showing that individual 
differences can account for people's tendency to call something “old”—that is, to 
say they remember having seen that thing earlier (e.g. Kantner & Lindsay, in 
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press). In one study, over a number of  experiments and tasks, some people tended 
to respond liberally on a memory test, needing less evidence to conclude they had 
seen something before (Kantner & Lindsay, in press). Others tended to respond 
conservatively, needing relatively more evidence before they would conclude they 
had seen something before. In summary, this study provided evidence for 
individual differences in how people weigh memory evidence in recognition 
memory tests (see also Aminoff  et al., 2012). There might also be individual 
differences in how people weigh nonprobative evidence in the context of  a true/
false judgment.  
Perhaps some of  our subjects had a lower threshold for relevant or convincing 
evidence and thus were particularly swayed by nonprobative evidence. To 
examine this idea, one avenue for future research would be to test whether people 
who show truthiness on one task, for instance in the trivia study, would also show 
truthiness in another task, for instance judging claims about celebrities. If  there is 
a stable individual difference in people's tendency to be swayed by nonprobative 
information, we should see that truthiness on one task predicts truthiness on 
another task. In fact we might expect that these effects would extend beyond 
photos, because we know that people turn to many kinds of  nonprobative 
evidence to make true/false judgements. That is, people who show truthiness with 
photos might also be more inclined to show truthiness with claims that have been 
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repeated, presented in high color contrast, or primed with semantically related 
ideas.20
Other individual difference measures might also inform us about people's 
susceptibility to truthiness and help illuminate underlying cognitive mechanisms. If 
nonprobative photos produce truthiness partly because they help people generate 
mental imagery relating to a claim, then photos might have particularly powerful 
effects for those people who struggle with mental imagery (cf. Petrova & Cialdini, 
2005). Conversely, people who routinely engage in imagery might experience only 
a modest boost in processing a claim when it is paired with a photo and show very 
little truthiness. This idea fits with the findings reported in this thesis: When 
people judged unfamiliar, or difficult claims—those that should be more difficult 
to image than familiar or easy claims—they were most susceptible to the effects of 
nonprobative photos. Perhaps we would find similar effects across individuals, 
rather than items.
Practical Implications 
Education
The educational psychological literature says that pictures can help by 
scaffolding new information, connecting it to prior knowledge, and improving 
comprehension and memory (Marcus, Cooper, & Sweller, 1996; Mayer, 2008). But 
that literature also shows that pictures help only when they represent relevant 
concepts, not when they are tangential decorations (see Carney & Levin, 2002). 
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20 There is also evidence that more transient features of an individual such as mood or using analytical thinking can influence the 
extent to which people use cues such as processing fluency to inform their judgements (Halberstadt & Catty, 2008; Halberstadt & 
Hooton, 2008; Koch & Forgas, 2012; Ruder & Bless, 2003).
Our research adds to this body of  work and suggests that photos that decorate—
ones that do not provide evidence for ideas in a piece of  text—can influence 
people’s judgments in the moment and boost the perceived truth of  the material 
they are paired with. 
What we do not know from our research is whether photos would do more 
than just bias people’s responses, perhaps photos would influence how much effort 
people exert when trying to make sense of  new information. Consider for a 
moment the research showing that people use ease of  processing to guide the 
amount of  effort or attention they invest in a task (Diemand-Yauman et al., 2011; 
Yue, Castel, & Bjork, in press). Indeed, when something feels difficult to process 
people tend to invest more attention to the task at hand, and are thus better at 
detecting inaccuracies (Song & Schwarz, 2008). It follows then, that pairing new 
information with unrelated nonprobative photos should encourage a more critical 
analysis of  the details at hand. A manipulation like this in the context of  
education might help students better detect discrepancies and ward off  
misconceptions (cf. research on seductive details; Harp & Mayer, 1997; Lehman, 
Schraw, McCrudden, & Hartley, 2007).21
Media and Public Information Campaigns
 In the context of  the media and public information campaigns,  photos and 
images are typically used to grab our attention and make information more 
memorable. Indeed there is a large literature that tells us that photos do these 
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21 Although correcting misconceptions often requires elaborate interventions (see for instance, Gregg, Winer, Cottrell, Hedman, & 
Fournier, 2001; Kowalski & Taylor, 2009), pairing misconceptions with an unrelated photo might make the misconception seem more 
false, and (or) encourage people to think more critically about the claim.
things (e.g., Mayer & Gallini, 1990; Sargent, 2007; Strange et al., 2011). But our 
research suggests a caution. Although related nonprobative photos might boost the 
truthiness of  messages, when paired with warnings or false information, photos 
could be dangerous. In one study, subjects saw a series of  messages from a typical 
“myth and facts” campaign. In an initial encoding phase subjects were told which 
messages were myths and which were facts, either once or three times (Skurnik, 
Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). For those people who took a test 30 minutes later 
repeated warnings about myths helped them—they were more accurate at judging 
the truth of  the messages. But for those people (particularly, older adults) who took 
a test three days later, repeated warnings about myths hurt them and made myths 
turn into facts. That is, after a delay people remembered the message, but not the 
information regarding its accuracy (for a review see Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & 
Yoon, 2007; see also sleeper effect Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kumkale & 
Albarracin, 2004; Pratkanis, Greenwald, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1988). Pairing 
photos with myths might provide an especially powerful instantiation of  the 
sleeper effect—photos might lead people to elaborate on the general content of  
the message or distract the reader from the information about accuracy, making 
myths rapidly grow into facts.
Final Remarks
Taken together, the 7 experiments reported here suggest that nonprobative 
photographs do more than simply decorate claims: they wield a significant and 
immediate influence on beliefs and decision making. For cognitive scientists, our 
data suggest that photos are a novel manipulation of  fluency, and fit with a broad 
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class of  effects related to inferences about metacognitive experience and the 
availability of  hypothesis-consistent evidence (Jacoby, et al., 1989; Johnson, 2006; 
Schwarz, 2010; Whittlesea, 2011). 
Our research shows that nonprobative information influences people’s 
judgements about general knowledge claims. But the effects of  nonprobative 
information might extend to judgements about our own lives. When people 
evaluated whether events have happened, or are likely to happen to them, they 
often use cognitive availability to gauge reality (Brown & Marsh, 2008; Sherman 
et al., 1985; see also Belli, Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, & Lynn, 1998; Garry et 
al., 1996). So perhaps nonprobative information would boost the truthiness of  
claims about our own lives. Thus, an important question for future research is to 
determine whether photographs can do more than mislead us into believing 
claims, they might also rapidly rewrite our autobiographies and bias our estimates 
of  future events. 
Our data also suggest caution when images are used in contexts such as the 
criminal justice system. Although pictures and images usually help—boosting 
comprehension and memory for complex material, it is possible that images might 
also manufacture a sense of  (perhaps unwarranted) authority (see Feigenson, 2010 
for a recent discussion of  the use if  visual evidence in the courtroom).
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Appendix A
Table 1.
Celebrity Names from Experiment 1A and 1B
Alive Names
 
Dead Names
 
Familiarity
Experiment 1A Harper Lee Donald Bradman Low
Kelsey Grammer Lloyd Bridges Low
Pete Townshend Ben Hogan Low
Jacques Chirac Augusto Pinochet Low
Geoffrey Palmer Jim Morrison Low
Joni Mitchell Marlon Brando Low
Jack Nicklaus Brandon Lee Low
Taito Phillip Field Charlton Heston Low
Bob Geldof Pol Pot Low
Kofi Annan Jacques Cousteau Low
Jimmie Carter Evel Knievel High
Neil Young Jeff Buckley High
Noam Chomsky Nina Simone High
Lee Tamahori David Lange High
Kevin Costner Janet Frame High
Judi Dench Christopher Reeve High
Ray Romano Richard Nixon High
Margaret Thatcher Kurt Cobain High
David Copperfield Rosa Parks High
Stephen Hawking Peter Blake High
James Watson Jack Lemmon Low
Nick Cave John Wheeler Low
Tony Bennett Benazir Bhutto Low
Carl Lewis Arthur C. Clarke Low
John McEnroe Luther Vandross Low
Jerry Lee Lewis Slobodan Milosevic Low
B.B. King John Ritter Low
Joan Collins Rick James Low
Jane Fonda Gerald Ford Low
John Cleese Jacqueline Kennedy Low
Rupert Murdoch Robert Atkins High
Bob Charles Billy T James High
Fidel Castro Katharine Hepburn High
Willie Nelson Dame Te Atairangikaahu High
Ian McKellen Linda McCartney High
Colin Meads River Phoenix High
Kenny Rogers Barry White High
77 
Michael Cullen Robert Muldoon High
Jim Bolger Yasser Arafat High
Stephen King Pope John Paul High
Experiment 1B Marc Garneau Fred Hoyle Low
Roberta Bondar John Tukey Low
Linda Evangelista Nicole Reinhart Low
Jacques Chirac Jerry Falwell Low
Desmond Tutu Jam Master Jay Low
Kofi Annan Carl Sagan Low
Joan Collins Augusto Pinochet Low
Ian McKellen Slobodan Milosevic Low
Tonya Harding Lloyd Bridges Low
Jerry Lee Lewis Wilt Chamberlain Low
John Cleese Sir Edmund Hillary
Judi Dench Jacqueline Kennedy High
James Watson Aaliyah High
Joni Mitchell Marlon Brando High
BB King Linda McCartney High
Jane Fonda Chris Farley High
Aretha Franklin Jacques Cousteau High
Howie Mandel Katharine Hepburn High
Bruce Springsteen Dr Seuss High
Stephen King Jimi Hendrix High
Sean Connery Johnny Cash High
Joe Frazier Michael Hutchence Low
Bob Geldof Jonathan Mann Low
Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin Donald Bradman Low
Pete Townshend Florence Joyner Low
Carl Lewis PW Botha Low
Henry Heimlich Idi Amin Low
Sidney Poitier Bill Hicks Low
Jack Nicklaus Pol Pot Low
Carly Simon Owen Hart Low
Ralph Nader Jeff Buckley Low
Ron Howard Chris Benoit
Cat Stevens Joe Dimaggio High
George Foreman John Candy High
Kelsey Grammer Bob Hope High
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Kenny Rogers Gerald Ford High
David Copperfield Rick James High
Stephen Hawking Evel Knievel High
Margaret Thatcher Barry White High
Fidel Castro Pope John Paul II High
Muhammad Ali Ray Charles High
Lance Armstrong Frank Sinatra High
Note. In order to make the groups of names even across factors and 
counterbalancing, we excluded four names from analyses, leaving a 
total of 80 names as in Exp 1A. These four names had the median 
familiarity rating for each group (High Familiarity Dead, Low 
Familiarity Dead, High Familiarity Alive, Low Familiarity Alive). When 
we do include them in our analyses, they do not change the pattern of 
results.
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Table 2. 
Signal Detection parameters for claims presented with or without a photo.
     
 
 
Names
 
Bias 
Photo
 
Bias
No Photo
 
d’         
Photo
d’          
No Photo
 
Experiment 1A          
           
 “Alive” Familiar -.28 (0.54)-.28 (0.48) 1.35 (1.03) .90 (0.95)
  Unfamiliar -.01 (0.45) .07 (0.62) .77 (0.82) .86 (1.14)
           
“Dead” Familiar .02 (0.48) .16 (0.51) 1.26 (0.99) .75 (0.91)
  Unfamiliar -.05 (0.40) .14 (0.37) .57 (0.99) .46 (0.78)
Experiment 1B          
 “Alive” Familiar .00 (0.41)-.01 (0.40) 1.01 (0.85) .43 (0.86)
  Unfamiliar -.13 (0.47) .29 (0.58) .47 (0.61) .37 (0.72)
           
“Dead” Familiar -.03 (0.43) .18 (0.37) .96 (1.07) .58 (0.60)
  Unfamiliar .21 (0.45) .50 (0.77) .21 (0.74) .36 (0.64)
Experiment 2          
Photo          
 “Alive” Unfamiliar -.09 (0.44) .28 (0.47) .12 (0.56) -.05 (0.68)
 
“Dead” Unfamiliar .07 (0.55) .46 (1.03) -.33 (0.73) .04 (0.98)
 Verbal
 “Alive” Unfamiliar -.12 (0.44) .28 (0.39) -.15 (0.70) .19 (0.53)
 
“Dead” Unfamiliar .07 (0.57) .22 (0.67) -.24 (0.66) .37 (0.71)
Experiment 3
Trivia Statements Easy -.13 (0.51)-.07 (0.51) 2.43 (0.89) 2.53 (1.19)
Difficult -.17 (0.38) .04 (0.46) .12 (0.76) .17 (0.78)
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Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Negative bias (c) values show 
a bias to say true. Higher sensitivity (d’) values indicate better 
discrimination ability. In Experiment 1A and 1B, photos increased accuracy 
for familiar but not unfamiliar names. In Experiment 2 photos reduced 
accuracy for unfamiliar names; in Experiment 3, photos had no effect on 
accuracy. The finding that photos increased people’s accuracy in judging 
claims about familiar celebrities fits with the idea that photos serve as rich 
retrieval cues that help people access information regarding the truth of a 
statement. But this pattern did not replicate for easy trivia claims in 
Experiment 3—seeing a photo with a trivia claim did not increase people’s 
accuracy. One explanation that might account for these different patterns is 
that people were generally more accurate in Experiment 3 than Experiment 
1. That is, the claims in Experiment 3 were easier to answer than claims in 
Experiment 1.  So it might be that adding a photo to a claim that people get 
correct approximately 80-100% of the time might do very little to further 
boost accuracy. In fact the educational psychological literature tells us 
something similar: if text is easy to understand, adding a picture doesn’t 
affect comprehension and memory. The more difficult the text is and the less 
general knowledge the subject has about the topic, the more a picture helps 
(see: Mayer 1992; Levin & Mayer, 1993). Taken together these data suggest 
that there might be some optimal level of difficulty where a photo facilitates 
accurate recall of facts. 
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Table 3.
Hits and False Alarms for claims presented with or without a photo (Experiments 
1-3)
     
 
 
Familiarity/
Difficulty
 
Hits
Photo
Hits
No Photo 
FAs        
Photo
FAs          
No Photo
 
Experiment 1A          
           
Familiar 0.74 (0.18) 0.65 (0.22) 0.34 (0.20) 0.39 (0.19)
  Unfamiliar 0.62 (0.20) 0.56 (0.20) 0.40 (0.19) 0.37 (0.20)
         
Experiment 1B        
Familiar 0.66 (0.19) 0.56 (0.18) 0.33 (0.19) 0.38 (0.19)
  Unfamiliar 0.56 (0.20) 0.43 (0.23) 0.43 (0.20) 0.33 (0.21)
   
Experiment 2  
Photo 0.51 (0.20) 0.38 (0.25) 0.52 (0.18) 0.37 (0.21)
 
Verbal 0.47 (0.21) 0.45 (0.20) 0.53 (0.19) 0.37 (0.20)
 
Experiment 3
Easy 0.87 (0.10) 0.85 (0.16) 0.19 (0.14) 0.17 (0.15)
Difficult 0.58 (.20) 0.52 (0.17) 0.54 (0.17) 0.46 (0.22)
Note. In calculating d’ and c, I had to convert the proportion of Hit and FAs to z scores. When Hit/
FA were 1 or 0, this was not possible and so I used a standard adjustment of the Hit/FA rates by 
converting values of 1 to .99 and values of 0 to .01 (Wickens, 2002). 
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Appendix C
Table 4. Trivia Statements from Experiment 3
Trivia Statements Difficulty
 
Dogs have better memories than cats False Ambiguous
The bird that lays the largest egg in relation to its own size is the hummingbird False Ambiguous
Cactuses can reproduce by parthenogenesis False Ambiguous
The colour green has the longest wavelength in the spectrum False Ambiguous
A "full house" is a poker hand in which all cards are of the same suit False Ambiguous
Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches False Ambiguous
The Cobra is the largest snake in the world False Ambiguous
The Cocos Islands are part of Indonesia False Ambiguous
The Yonghe Temple is in Shanghai False Ambiguous
The statuette on a Rolls Royce is called "The Victorian Whisper" False Ambiguous
Giraffes are the only mammals that cannot jump False Ambiguous
The first heart-lung machine was commissioned in the Netherlands False Ambiguous
The liquid metal inside a thermometer is magnesium False Ambiguous
The electric chair was invented by an accountant False Ambiguous
A quarter of the bones in your body are in your hands False Ambiguous
The only fish that can blink with both eyes at once is the manta ray False Ambiguous
Pumpkin is good for vision False Easy
Olive oil is the only food that doesn’t spoil False Easy
The name for a group of birds is a school False Easy
The capital of France is Lyon False Easy
Galileo discovered gravity False Easy
An elephant can see all of its feet at the same time False Easy
The short pleated skirt worn by men in Scotland is called a fife False Easy
An ostrich is a pink coloured bird that stands on one leg False Easy
Pearls are most often found inside scallops False Easy
Neptune is the planet known for its rings False Easy
The space shuttle that exploded in the mid 1980s was called the Champion False Easy
Zeus is the legendary one eyed giant in Greek mythology False Easy
Intelligent people have more iron and manganese in their hair False Easy
Archie is a comic strip character who eats spinach for strength False Easy
Soccer is the sport associated with Wimbledon False Easy
Cricket is played with a ball that has three holes in it False Easy
Women dream more than men True Ambiguous
Turtles are deaf True Ambiguous
The name of the Russian space station MIR means PEACE True Ambiguous
The Mona Lisa has no eyebrows True Ambiguous
The plastic things on the ends of shoelaces are called aglets True Ambiguous
The largest European glacier is Vatnajökull on Iceland True Ambiguous
There are 120 drops of water in a teaspoon True Ambiguous
Starfish don’t have brains True Ambiguous
Alberto Fujimori is a former president of Peru True Ambiguous
The cat is the only pet not mentioned in the bible True Ambiguous
A group of people hired to applaud an act or performer is called a ‘claque’ True Ambiguous
Months that begin with a Sunday will always have a Friday the 13th True Ambiguous
A wobbler is a lure that is used for fishing True Ambiguous
Seine nets are nets used for deep sea fishing True Ambiguous
Honeybees kill more people worldwide each year than all poisonous snakes... True Ambiguous
Clark Gable was the actor who played Rhett Butler in "Gone with the Wind" True Ambiguous
Tea is the most popular beverage in China True Easy
There are 336 dimples on a regulation golf ball True Easy
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Strawberries are the only fruit whose seeds grow on the outside True Easy
Apples are more efficient than caffeine at waking you up in the morning True Easy
Neil Armstrong was the first person on the moon True Easy
Everest is the tallest mountain in the world True Easy
The cheetah is the animal that runs the fastest True Easy
The flower necklace worn in Hawaii is called a lei True Easy
A one-lens eye piece is called a monocle True Easy
A compass is a navigation instrument used at sea to plot position True Easy
An ostrich’s eye is bigger than its brain True Easy
The first stamps were issued in England True Easy
The player who guards the net in soccer is called the goalie True Easy
A great white is a type of man-eating shark True Easy
The main food consumed by half of the people worldwide is rice True Easy
Bats use soundwaves to locate and direct themselves during flight True Easy
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Appendix D
Table 5.  
Discrimination (d’) for claims presented with or without a related or unrelated 
photo. Experiments 4-6.
 
 
d’       Statistical 
Analyses
Experiment 4    
     
Related Photos .22 (1.44) A one way repeated measures ANOVA showed no 
main effect for photo F(2, 206) = .36, p = .70, ηp2 
= .003.
Unrelated Photos .15 (1.19)
No Photos .26 (1.40)
Experiment 5    
 
Related Condition
A 2(photo: photo vs. no photo) x 2(relatedness: 
related vs. unrelated) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor showed no main effect 
for relatedness, F(1, 194) = 2.16, p =.14, ηp2 = .
01.; no main effect for photos, F(1, 194) = .55, p =.
46, ηp2 = .003. and no Photo x Relatedness 
interaction, F(1, 194) = 2.03, p =.16, ηp2 = .01.
Related Photos .34 (0.74)
No Photos .18 (0.70)
Unrelated Condition
Unrelated Photos .34 (0.72)
No Photos .39 (0.65) 
Experiment 6
 
Related Photos .24 (0.44) A one way ANOVA showed no effect for photo, 
F(2, 298) = .1.71, p =.18, ηp2 = .01.
Unrelated Photos .28 (0.47)
No Photos .36 (0.53)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Higher sensitivity (d’) values 
indicate better discrimination ability.
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Table 6.
Hits and False Alarms for claims presented with or without a photo 
(Experiments 4-6)
 
 
Hits       FAs
Experiment 4    
     
Related Photos 0.55 (0.25) 0.49 (0.29)
Unrelated Photos 0.50 (0.25) 0.46 (0.25)
No Photos 0.51 (0.27) 0.43 (0.26)
Experiment 5
 
Related Condition
Related Photos 0.59 (0.18) 0.48 (0.20)
No Photos 0.53 (0.21) 0.46 (0.20)
Unrelated Condition
Unrelated Photos 0.54 (0.21) 0.42 (.17)
No Photos 0.58 (.17) 0.45 (0.19)
Experiment 6
 
Related Photos 0.56 (0.13) 0.47 (0.16)
Unrelated Photos 0.54 (0.16) 0.44 (0.19)
No Photos 0.57 (0.16) 0.44 (0.16)
Note. In calculating d’ and c, I had to convert the proportion of Hit and FAs to z scores. 
When Hit/FA were 1 or 0, this was not possible and so I used a standard adjustment of 
the Hit/FA rates by converting values of 1 to .99 and values of 0 to .01 (Wickens, 2002). 
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Table 7. Discrimination Analyses for Replications of Experiments 4-6
 
 
d’ 
Related
Photo
 
d’
Unrelated 
Photo
 
d’
No 
Photo
 
Statistical 
Analyses
Experiment 4        
         
Replication 1: Practice 
phase with unrelated 
photos
.16 (1.30) .28 (1.33) .08 (1.37) A one way repeated measures 
ANOVA showed no main effect 
for photo F(2, 202) = 1.20, p = .
31, ηp2 = .01.
Replication 2: With no 
practice phase
.18 (1.30) .12 (1.29) .22 (1.26) A one way repeated measures 
ANOVA showed no main effect 
for photo F(2, 214) = .35, p = .70. 
ηp2 = .01.
 
Experiment 5
 
A 2(photo: photo vs. no photo) x 
2(relatedness: related vs. 
unrelated) mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first 
factor showed a Photo x 
Relatedness interaction, F(1, 
183) = 5.95, p = .02, ηp2 = .03. 
regardless of condition, when 
people saw a photograph paired 
with a statement their 
discrimination was similar, t 
related photo-unrelated 
photo(83) = .45, p = .65, but 
when people evaluated claims 
without photos, those people in 
the unrelated condition had 
better discrimination than people 
in the related photo conditions, t 
unrelated no photo-related no 
photo (183) = 3.73, p < .01.
Replication 3 
Related  Condition .25 (0.75) * .10 (0.66)
Unrelated Condition * .30 (0.67) .47 (0.70)
Experiment 6
A one-way ANOVA showed no 
significant effect for evidence, 
F(2, 298) = .2.55, p = .08, ηp2 = .
02.
 
Replication 4 .20 (0.50) .31 (0.45) .34 (0.43)
Note. Higher sensitivity (d’) values indicate better discrimination ability. 
Considered together with the experiments reported in the main text, there 
were no consistent effects of photos on accuracy. 
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Appendix E
For Experiment 4 the 16 orienting items appeared with a related photo or no 
photo, followed by a random series of  24 trivia claims in the experiment proper of 
8 related, 8 unrelated, and 8 no photo. Therefore, people saw trivia claims with no 
photos 40% of  the time; trivia claims with related photos 40% of  the time, and 
trivia claims with unrelated photos only 20% of  the time. To address this issue, I 
reran Experiment 4 so that the 16 orienting items appeared with an unrelated 
photo or no photo (Replication 1), as well as another version of  Experiment 4 in 
which there was no orienting task (Replication 2). The orientating task in these 
two versions did not matter, and we replicated the primary findings in Experiment 
4. 
Methods Replication 1
Subjects
In Replication 1, I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com/
mturk), to recruit 204 subjects in the US. They received a $0.60 Amazon credit.
Design
I manipulated one within-subjects factor called photo, with three levels (related 
photo, unrelated photo, no photo).
Procedure
We used the same procedure as in Experiment 4, except that for the first 16 
trials,  half  of  the easy claims appeared with an unrelated photograph and half  
appeared without a photo. In other words, subjects saw unrelated photos 40% of  
the time; no photos 40% of  the time, and related photos only 20% of  the time. 
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Results and Discussion Replication 1
Figure E.1 shows that, consistent with Experiment 4 and our prior research, 
pairing a claim with a related nonprobative photo produced truthiness. But the 
figure also shows that changing the frequency of  items did not change the impact 
of  unrelated photos—unrelated photos behaved most like trials with no photos. 
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Figure E.1. Bias for difficult trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically 
related or unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% within-
subject confidence intervals for the photo factor for Replication 1  (see Masson & Loftus, 2003)
In other words, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed an effect for 
evidence, F(2, 202) = 4.29, p =.02, ηp2 = .04. Followup comparisons showed that 
although seeing related photos produced more bias to say true than seeing 
unrelated photos, t related-unrelated (203) = 2.18, p = .03, or no photos, t related-
no photo (203) = 2.78, p = .01, bias for unrelated and no photos was similar, t 
unrelated-no photo (203) = .77, p = .44.
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Methods Replication 2
Subjects
In Replication 2, I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com/
mturk), to recruit 216 subjects in the US. They received a $0.60 Amazon credit.
Design
I manipulated one within-subjects factor called photo, with three levels (related 
photo, unrelated photo, no photo).
Procedure
I used the same procedure as in Experiment 4, except that I removed the 
orienting phase. In other words, subjects saw a total of  24 trivia claims, an equal 
number of  trivia claims paired with unrelated photos, related photos, and no 
photos.
Results and Discussion Replication 2
Figure E.2 shows that, consistent with Experiment 4 and our prior research, 
pairing a claim with a related nonprobative photo produced truthiness. But the 
figure also shows that removing the orienting phase did not change the impact of  
unrelated photos—again, unrelated photos behaved just like trials with no photos. 
In other words, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed an effect for 
evidence, F(2, 214) = 4.25, p =.02, ηp2 = .04. Followup comparisons showed that 
although seeing related photos produced more bias to say true than seeing 
unrelated photos, t related-unrelated (215) = 2.85, p < .01, or no photos, t related-
no photo (215) = 1.90, p = .06, bias for unrelated and no photos was similar, t 
unrelated-no photo (215) = 1.03, p = .30.
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Figure E.2. Bias for difficult trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically 
related or unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals for the photo factor for Replication 2  (see Masson & Loftus, 2003)
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Appendix F
I replicated Experiment 5 using exactly the same method. Subjects details and 
results of  Replication 3 are reported here.
Subjects
In Replication 3, I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com/
mturk), to recruit 185 subjects in the US. They received a $0.60 Amazon credit.
Design
As in Experiment 5, I used a 2 (photo: yes, no) x 2 (relatedness: related, 
unrelated) mixed design, manipulating the presence of  a photo within-subjects 
and relatedness of  the photo between-subjects. 
Procedure
I used the same procedure as in Experiment 5. 
Results and Discussion Replication 3
Figure F.1 shows that, consistent with Experiment 5 when we manipulated the 
relatedness of  photos between-subjects, we found truthiness and falsiness. 
Compared to when people saw trivia claims with no photo, when people 
responded to a claim paired with a related photo, they were biased to conclude the 
claim was true. In contrast, compared to when people saw trivia claims with no 
photo, when people responded to a claim paired with an unrelated photo, they 
were biased to conclude the claim was false 
In other words, a 2(photo: photo vs. no photo) x 2(relatedness: related vs. 
unrelated) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor showed a 
Photo x Relatedness interaction, F(1, 183) = 18.22, p < .01, ηp2 = .09, related 
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Figure F.1. Bias for difficult trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically related 
or unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals for the photo effect for related and unrelated conditions in Replication 3  (see Masson & Loftus, 
2003)
photos produced truthiness t related-no photo(83) = 4.07, p <.01, but unrelated 
photos produced falsiness, t unrelated-no photo (100) = 1.94, p = .06.
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Appendix G
I replicated Experiment 6 using exactly the same method. Subjects details and 
results of  Replication 4 are reported here.
Subjects
In Replication 4, I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com/
mturk), to recruit 301 subjects in the US. They received a $0.60 Amazon credit.
Design
As in Experiment 6, I manipulated one between-subjects factor called 
evidence, with three levels (related photo, unrelated photo, no photo).
Procedure
I used the same procedure as in Experiment 6. 
Results and Discussion Replication 4
Figure G. 1 shows that, consistent with Experiment 6 when we manipulated 
the relatedness of  photos between-subjects, we found neither truthiness nor 
falsiness. Rather, when people did not have a standard to compare their 
experience to, photos did not influence their true/false decisions. In other words, a 
one-way ANOVA showed no effect for evidence, F(2, 298) = .1.02, p = .36, ηp2 = .
01.
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Figure G.1. Bias for difficult trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically 
related or unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals for each cell mean in Replication 4  (see Masson & Loftus, 2003)
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Appendix H
In order to show that the effects in Experiment 6 and Appendix G are not 
specific to the general knowledge claims, I conducted a conceptual replication 
using the paradigm and materials used in Experiment 1A.  
Subjects
 In Replication 5, 44 undergraduate psychology students from Victoria 
University of  Wellington participated for course credit. 
Design
I used a 2 (photograph: yes, no) x 2 (familiarity: familiar, unfamiliar) mixed 
design, manipulating familiarity within subjects and photo between subjects.  
Procedure
I used the same procedure as in Experiment 1A, except the minor 
modifications that follow. In order to maximize power and because we found no 
effect of  claim type, instead of  responding to both “Alive” and “Dead” claims, in 
Replication 5 people only responded to “Alive” claims. The only other 
modification is that the presence of  a photo was manipulated between-subjects.
Results and Discussion Replication 5
Figure H.1 shows that, consistent with Experiment 6 when we manipulated 
the presence of  photos between-subjects, we did not find truthiness. Rather, we 
found that familiar names produced truthiness. Compared to unfamiliar names, 
people responded true more often when they assessed the claim “This famous 
person is alive” for familiar celebrity names. This finding fits with an effect we 
observed in Experiment 1B—regardless of  whether a photo was present, people 
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responded true more often to the “Alive” claim when they made true/false 
decisions for familiar names. Taken together, these patterns fit with the idea that 
photos exert an effect when they make the claim feel easier to process than a 
standard—that is established within the experimental context.
In other words, a repeated measures 2 (photograph: yes, no) x 2 (familiarity: 
familiar, unfamiliar) mixed ANOVA showed no effect for photos, F <1, but an 
effect for familiarity, F(1, 42) = 23.58, p < .01, ηp2 = .36. Photo did not interact 
with familiarity F <1.
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Figure H.1. Bias for claims about familiar and unfamiliar names presented with or without a photograph 
(between-subjects). Negative value of c is a bias to say true. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence 
intervals for the familiarity effect for the photo and no photo conditions (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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